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This paper determines  which children work and how much children work in Kenya. The 
results show that the educational level of the head of household is important, but it does not 
matter if the head has primary or higher education. Social norms have a strong effect on the 
child’s probability of working and access to the labor market is important. The overall finding 
is not consistent with the view that it is children from the poorest families who work.  
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1. Introduction 
          The problem of child work has several dimensions. Apart from possibly harming the 
child’s physical and mental health, it can negatively affect the child’s accumulation of human 
capital if work comes at the expense of education. This may in turn reduce the child’s adult 
earnings (Emerson and Souza 2007). In a broader perspective it can also damage the national 
economy itself, since human capital is an important factor in the long-run development of a 
country.  
        In order to know which measures should be taken to reduce the rate of working children, 
we need  to  know what determines  if a child  works or not. Even though there is  a  large 
literature  on  working  children,  there  is  no  consensus  on  how  to  eliminate  the  problem. 
Different  empirical  studies  have  found  different  determinants  of  children’s  work.  The 
different results might to some extent be explained by different definitions and econometric 
models, but there can also be different explanations for different countries. 
         This paper contributes to the existing literature by examining the determinants of child 
work in Kenya. We analyze the working decision in conjunction with the decision to be in 
school, since work and school compete for the child’s limited time. We do this by using a  
bivariate probit model, which allows the working and schooling decision to depend on each 
other. To control for how different samples and definitions of the dependent variable affect 
the  result,  we  run  the  regression  with  different  definitions  and  samples.  This  also  gives 
insights into how results from different studies can be compared. 
      The literature on working children often neglects the impact of social norms, which are 
hard to measure but can give important information on why the rate of working children 
differs between different places. In contrast to most previous papers, we attempt to examine 
the role of social norms.  2 
 
     Furthermore, using a tobit model, we examine what determines how much the child works, 
which is important since working long hours is more harmful to the child. Even so, this issue 
has often been left out in most previous studies. 
          We use data from the Integrated Labour Force Survey conducted by the Central Bureau 
of Statistics (CBS) in 1998/1999, and our sample consists of children from the age of 6 to 14. 
Our main findings show that the educational level of the head of household is important for 
the decision to let the child work or not. We also find that the social norm has a strong effect 
on a child’s probability of working. Our results are consistent with the view that access to the 
labor market is important, but does not support the hypothesis that it is children from the 
poorest families that work.    3 
 
2. Which children work?
  
2.1. Poverty and child labor 
In their seminal paper Basu and Van (1998) argue that sometimes poverty gives parents no 
choice but to send their children to work. They build their model on the substitution and the 
luxury axioms.
1 The substitution axiom states that an employer treats adult labor and child 
labor as substitutes. The luxury axiom states that parents only send t heir children to work if 
the income without child labor is under some subsistence level. The luxury axiom implies that 
a rise in income does not have any effect on the incidence of child labor when the wage is too 
low for families to survive without lettin g the children work.  To influence the incidence of 
child labor the income has to rise above the subsistence level.  
           The model gives two stable equilibria. In the “good equilibrium”, the adult wage is so 
high that the family can survive on income from adult labor and no children have to work. In 
the “bad equilibrium”, the wage is so low that income from adult labor is not enough to get 
the family an income over the subsistence level. Hence, parents have to send their children to 
work. 
           Even if parents do not get a disutility from sending their children to work, we still 
expect a negative relationship between family income and the child’s probability of working. 
Decreasing marginal utility of income means that, when the family income increases, the 
utility from income generated by children is reduced, making it less probable that parents 
send their children to work. A higher income also makes it possible for the family to afford 
things that can be substitutes for their children’s work. For instance, having access to a water 
source in the household will no longer make it necessary to walk long distances to get water. 
A higher income can also be used to purchase items that increase the child’s productivity in 
other activities (Edmonds and Pavcnik 2005). Edmonds (2005) finds that the rate of working 
                                                 
1 For a summary of the literature on child work see for example Basu and Tzannatos  (2003), and Bhalotra and 
Tzannatos (2003) 4 
 
children in Vietnam decreased when the expenditures per capita increased. The relationship is 
nonlinear and does not hold for really poor or really rich families. Admassie (2002) used 
different macro variables to show that poverty one of the most important reasons for child 
labor in sub-Saharan Africa.   
          Even if the luxury axiom seems intuitive, it has not always been supported by empirical 
studies. For example, when Ray (2000) tested the luxury axiom using data from Peru and 
Pakistan, it gave no support for the axiom in Pakistan and only some weak support in Peru.
2 
       
2.2. Work and education 
Another subject that has received attention in the literature is the relationship between school 
and work. We assume that the child divides its time between work and education. Work 
increases the household’s current income. Education, on the other hand, lowers the current 
income, but gives a higher future income. School also incurs costs in the form of tuition, 
books,  school  uniform,  transportation  and  other  supplies.  Since  Kenya  lacks  an  old-age 
security system the future income is not only important for the child, but for the whole family 
(Buchmann 2000). 
         Ravallion and Wodon (2000) find that there is only a small reduction in child labor 
when the cost of education goes down, but that the school enrolment rate increases. The 
authors  conclude  that  parents  substitute  other  uses  of  their  child’s  time.  Psacharopoulos 
(1997) finds that working children in Bolivia and Venezuela spend on average two years less 
in school than non-working children. Working increases grade repetition, which indicates that 
time spent on school is substituted by work.  
          Bonnet (1993) argues that some children in Africa drop out of school and start working, 
not mainly because they need the income, but because the school does not provide vocational 
                                                 
2 When he, on the other hand, adds the data from both countries, he finds support for the luxury axiom. 5 
 
qualifications or prepare them for the life they will face. According to Buchmann (2000) 
dropping out of school to start wage labor is uncommon in Kenya. According to her data, of 
the 146 children who dropped out of school, only one did so to start working. The reasons for 
dropping out were instead poor performance and the inability to bear the expenses. 
          
2.3. Social norms and the decision on child work 
The decision to send the child to work can be influenced by social norms. If the norm says 
that children should not be sent to work then doing so imposes a cost on the parents. López-
Calva  (2002b)  argues  that  people  view  child  work  as  bad  since  they  think  it  is  morally 
unacceptable  and  that  child  work  might  deteriorate  the  labor  market  conditions  for  adult 
workers. They set up a model where the size of the cost depends on how many others are 
breaking the norm. A higher rate of working children in the same town gives a lower social 
cost of sending a child to work. The parents take the norm as given and it is not influenced by 
a single household’s decision. Patrinos and Shafiq (2008) argue that sending a child to work 
does not have to be seen as bad and in some situations the norm may even approve of child 
work. Strulik (2008) sets up a model that assumes that social norms affect the work decision 
only through schooling, where more time for school means less time for work. The norm 
depends on how many of the others in the neighborhood send their children to school. Strulik 
argues that the schooling choice is more affected by social norms, since this decision is more 
visible to others. He allows for the possibility that it may be socially preferable not to send the 
child to school.  
       Using data from Mexico, Lopez-Calva (2002a) finds that the rate of working children in a 
community has a positive and significant effect on a child’s probability of working 6 
 
2.4. Family structure 
When analyzing how the child’s time is divided, the size of the family is often included as an 
explanatory variable. A larger family means less resources per child. Becker and Thomes 
(1976) discuss how the quality and quantity of children come at the expense of each other. If 
the quality  of  children increases,  the shadow cost  of having more children  will  increase, 
which will decrease the demand for children. This would reduce the shadow price of quality, 
which will increase the demand for quality.   
         If a larger family means fewer resources per child, more siblings reduce the child’s 
probability of being in school and increase the child’s probability of working. The empirical 
results have been mixed though. Patrinos and Psacharpoulos (1997) that we have to take the 
activities of the siblings into consideration. Having siblings that are too young to be in school 
means that someone has to take care of and provide for them.  
               Children  from  the  same  household  often  work  different  amounts  of  time.  One 
explanation may be that parents have different preferences for their children. Edmonds (2006) 
sets up a model that gives different labor supply for siblings even when the parents care 
equally about them. The child’s time is assumed to be divided between work and education. 
Edmonds shows that if one compares two siblings, the ratio of their marginal product of labor 
in household production should equal the ratio of their marginal return to education. This can 
be  used  to  explain  differences  in  labor  supply  between  siblings  of  different  age.  If  the 
productivity in household work increases when the child gets older, the older child will have a 
comparative advantage in household production. This makes the difference in labor supply 
between  siblings  increase  with  age  difference.  The  model  also  gives  implications  for  the 
difference in labor supply between genders. If the return to education is higher for boys, they 
should get more education than girls in order for the equilibrium to hold. 7 
 
        It is important to notice that the use of a child’s time is not necessarily determined by the 
real productivity, but what the parents assume the productivity to be. When Buchmann (2000) 
interviewed mothers in Kenya, 26 percent stated that boys were smarter than girls and 24 
percent thought that the job market was worse for women than for men. Buchmann finds that 
daughters of parents who think the job opportunities are more limited for women have a lower 
probability of being enrolled in school. The belief that boys are smarter than girls did not 
influence the probability for girls to be in school.  
           Edmonds (2006) tests his model using data from Nepal. The result shows that older 
siblings  work  more  than  younger  ones.  The  effect  increases  with  family  size  and  the 
difference is larger for girls than for boys.  
          Using  data  from  Peru,  Patrinos  and  Psacharopoulos  (1997)  find  that  having  more 
younger siblings increases a child’s probability of working. In an earlier paper (1995), using 
data from Paraguay, they find that the number of siblings does not have much of an effect on 
school enrolment, but has a positive impact on the probability of working. They argue that 
this could be a sign of specialization, where some siblings work and others go to school.  
 
2.5. Characteristics of the parents 
The  decision  on  how  much  the  child  is  going  to  work  can  be  analyzed  as  a  negotiation 
between the parents, which makes their characteristics important. Basu (2006) assumes that 
the household maximizes a weighted sum of the husband’s and the wife’s utility. How much 
weight the person gets depends on the balance of power, which is determined by the wage 
rate for women, cultural factors etc. How much power the respective parties have determines 
how much influence they have when deciding how to use the income generated by a working 
child. Both parents consider child labor as bad and they have different opinions regarding 
how to spend money. Basu (2006) shows that, starting from a situation where the mother has 8 
 
no power, child labor decreases when the mother’s power increases. The negative relationship 
holds up to a certain point, after which the amount of child labor increases, giving a u-shaped 
relationship between one parent’s power and the amount of child labor. This is because if the 
parents have different preferences on how to spend money but have equal power, each parent 
only gets part of the gain from the child labor. Still, both do feel the pain of sending the child 
to work. In contrast, if one of them has all the power, he/she gets full control over how to 
spend the extra income and is thereby more prone to send the child to work. If one of the 
parents regards child work as being worse than the other parent does, the extreme where this 
parent has all the power leads to less child labor than when the other parent has all the power.  
          Basu and Ray (2002) use data from Nepal to test the model. To estimate the mother’s 
power they use her educational experience in relation to the total educational experience of 
the most educated woman and man in the household, and the mother’s part of the household 
income. They conclude that the amount of child labor is minimized when the power between 
the parents is equal. Subsequently, the policy makers should try to increase the women’s 
power, since the men tend to be more powerful. They also find that the amount of child labor 
is greater when the husband is fully dominant.  
 
Another important  characteristic of  the parents is their education.  It has been shown that 
parents with higher education have a lower probability of sending their children to work and a 
higher probability of sending them to school. Bhalotra and Tzannatos (2003) that we can 
interpret the coefficient for education as the parents’ attitudes to work, aspirations for the 
child’s future, and time preferences.  
          To investigate the relationship between parents’ education and child work Emerson and 
Souza (2002) use data from Brazil. They conclude that children of higher educated parents 
have a lower probability of working and a higher probability of being in school.  9 
 
3. The data  
 
When we analyze working children two things need to clarified: who is counted as a child and 
how do we define work? Child labor is often distinguished from child work. Child work is an 
activity that does not have to interfere with the child’s schooling and does not need to harm 
the child’s physical and mental development. Child labor on the other hand is considered 
dangerous  to  the  child’s  welfare  and  interferes  with  schooling  (Bhukuth  2008).  The 
International Labour Organization uses a definition where the age of the child decides who is 
counted as a child laborer. An older child is allowed to do harder work than a younger one. 
The minimum age for employment is limited by the age at completing school, and should 
never be less than 15 years. An exception is made for light work that does not hinder the child 
from attending school and is not considered hazardous (CBS 2001). Children start school at 
the age of six in Kenya (UNICEF 2008). Our analysis will therefore focus on children 6 -14 
years old.  
             We use data from the Integrated Labor Force Survey conducted by the Central Bureau 
of Statistics (CBS) in Kenya from December 1998 to January 1999
3. The CBS randomly 
selected 12 814 households for interviews. Out of these 11 049 participated, which gave 52 
016  individuals.
4    The  sample  includ es  13  991  children  aged  6-14  years,  but  is  not 
representative for the population  of  Kenya. To control for this ,  we run the model using 
weights.  
                                                 
3 The survey was done with technical and financial assistance from The International Labor Organization (ILO). 
The author of this rapport has full responsibility for any mistakes and misinterpretations of the data.  
4 The data of the survey is summarized by the Central Bureau of Statistics (2001). 10 
 
       The children were asked whether or not they worked for pay, profit or family gain last 
week.
5  We define children who answered yes to that question as working children.
6 Table 1 
shows the percentage of the working children in each age group.   
 
< Table 1 > 
 
The  relationship between age and the probability  of working  is positive. The difference 
between genders is small, with slightly higher numbers for boys.  
         The average rate of working children in the sample is 7.7 percent.  The question in the 
survey was whether the child had worked during the week before the survey. If there were 
children that did not work this specific week, but who worked during other  times of the year, 
this would give an underestimation of the  true rate of working children. For example, more 
children work during harvest. By asking the children if they worked any  time during the 
previous 12 months, the percentage of working children increased to 17.3 percent
7. Since we 
expect that there are different reasons for working a couple of days during a school break , as 
opposed to working during the school semester, we will continue to use the smaller sample in 
our estimations.  
   
                                                 
5 It is to some extent unclear what is supposed to be included in the definition. If, for example, helping in the 
household should be included or not is not clear, and can have considerable influence on the results. For more 
about the definitions see CBS (2001).  
6 It might be the case that some children stated that they did not work even though they did, since working in 
some situations is illegal.  
7 Another thing to notice is that the survey only includes the children that live in a household.   
 11 
 
4. Characteristics of the sample 
 




According to the children the main reason was to help with household chores or to augment 
household income. The head of household supported this view and stated that the two main 
reasons were to help in the family business/farm and to augment the household income. There 





 Some children worked so many hours that it would be impossible to be a full-time student at 
the same time. According to the children who did not work, being a full-time student was the 
main reason not to work (74.3 percent).   
        Kenya’s  school  system  consists  of  eight  years  of  primary  education,  four  years  of 
secondary education and four years of college/university studies. The primary education is 
mandatory and the child is supposed to start at the age of six and continue until the age of 





      The relationship between age and school participation is positive between the ages of 6 
and 11, but then turns negative. The explanation could be that some children do not start 
school when they are six, but when they are older, and not all children complete primary 
education.
8  The rate of working children is lower in the group of full-time students where 5.9 
percent of the children  were working, in comparison with 13.1   percent in the  group  of 
children that did not go to school full-time. This supports the view that school and work come 
at the expense of each other. Even if work does not make the child drop out of school, it can 
still have negative effects on  the performance in school. 30.4 percent of the students who 
worked answered that work had a negative effect on school.    
         According to CBS (2001), poverty was the main reason for child labor in Kenya. If this 
is the case, working children would generally live in poorer households than  those who are 
not  working.  Unfortunately,  it   is  problematic  to  get  reliable  income  information.  The 
respondent may not want to give the true answer due to the sensitive topic and sometimes the 
respondent may not know. According to Deaton (2000), this can be the case for agricultural 
households and family businesses where personal and business incomings and outgoings are 
easily confused. Another problem is that income  is  often highly volatile, which makes it 
sensitive to which time period the estimation comes from. A less volatile measurement of 
poverty is expenditures, which i s frequently  used instead of income. The   data show  no 
statistical  difference  in  the  mean  expenditures  per  capita  between  the  households  with 
working children and the households where the children were not working.
9 
    
                                                 
8 For more about what determines school enrollment and education attainment in Kenya see Kabubo-Mariara and 
Mwabu (2007) or Deolalikar (1997).  
9 Households that answered that they had zero expenditures during the previous month have been considered as 
measurement errors and have been deleted. Since the numbers are calculated from the children, this means that a 
family with many children will be included more times. If poorer families have more children they will be 
counted more times than smaller families.  13 
 
          Since the decision to send the child to work or not is often taken by the parents, we are 
interested in their characteristics. However, the data do not contain any information about 
who the parents are, so we will concentrate on the characteristics of the head of household. 




In the subsample of working children, a larger proportion of the heads of households have no 
education.             
            
           The decision to send the child to work or not is also influenced by external factors, 
such as unemployment rate and access to school. We try to capture some of these differences 
by  including  province  dummies.  Kenya  is  divided  into  eight  provinces:  Nairobi,  Central, 
Coast, Eastern, North Eastern, Nyanza, Rift Valley and Western. The variation in poverty and 
human development is large between provinces and there is also  a variation in access to 
services (World Bank 2008).   





The rate of working children is highest in the Coastal, Eastern and Western provinces. These 
are the areas with the highest incidence of poverty and, together with  North Eastern, the 
lowest rate of full-time students.  14 
 
        Furthermore, there is a difference between urban and rural areas. Geda et al (2001) found 
that there was more poverty in the rural areas, particularly in the agricultural sectors. In the 
urban areas the rate of working children was 2.5 percent in comparison to 8.3 percent in the 
rural areas. The rate of full-time students was 87.4 percent in the urban areas and 72.7 percent 
in the rural.    15 
 
5. Model and method 
5.1. The general model 
Different econometric models can be used to analyze the decision to let the child work. Each 
model requires different assumptions and comes with some disadvantages. Our main interest 
is the decision to work or not, which gives a binary dependent variable of one if the child is 
working and zero otherwise.  
        Another aspect to take into consideration is that the working decision most likely is 
linked  to  the  schooling  decision.  A  probit  or  logit  model  with  school  as  an  explanatory 
variable for the working decision will lead to simultaneity bias. To take these aspects into 
account we use a bivarite probit model,
10 which treats the working and schooling decision as 






1 + ε1      y1=1    if  y
*





2 + ε2      y2=2    if y
*
2 > 0, 0 otherwise 
 
E[ε1|x1,x2] = E[ε2|x1,x2] = 0 
Var[ε1|x1,x2] = Var[ε2|x1,x2] = 1 
Cov[ε1, ε2|x1,x2] = ρ 
 
y1i takes the value 1 if child i is working and 0 otherwise. y2i takes the value 1 if child i is a 
full time student and 0 otherwise. x1 is a vector of variables that explains the working decision 
and  x2  is  a  vector  of  variables  that  explains  the  schooling  decision.
11    The explanatory 
                                                 
10 Two other papers that use this model are Canagarajah and Coulombe (1997) and Nielsen (1998) 
11 Since the data only contains information about whether the child is a full time student or not, children that are 
in school part time are in the same group as the ones that are not in school at all.  16 
 
variables are divided into four groups: characteristics of the child, the household, the social 
norms and geographic characteristics. 
           ρ is the coefficient of correlation for the error terms, which means that it measures the 
correlation between the  outcomes, after the influences  from  the explanatory variables  are 
taken into account (Greene 2003).   
       The  model  is  estimated  with  maximum  likelihood.  To  get  a  feeling  for  how  the 
explanatory variables influence the dependent variable, we calculate the marginal effects.  
 
5.2. Child characteristics 
Earlier literature has shown that both age and gender have an impact on the child’s probability 
of working. For age we expect that an older child has a higher probability of working. We 
also include a variable indicating if the head of household is the biological parent of the child.  
 
5.3. Household characteristics 
The poverty measurements are used to test if poorer households are more likely to send their 
children  to  work  than  richer  ones.  A  methodological  problem  arises  since  the  household 
income and expenditures go up when the child works for pay, i.e. we get reversed causality 
and the variable is endogenous. This gives a positive bias in the coefficient. Bhalotra and 
Tzannatos (2003) argue that this can explain the insignificant and sometimes positive income 
effects  that  have  been  found.  This  problem  could  be  solved  by  removing  the  income 
generated by children, but this is difficult in practice, since surveys seldom provide a good 
measurement of how much the child earns.
12 In our sample 90 percent of the working children 
stated that they  were  not getting paid for their work.  This indicates that the endogeneity 
problem is not that grave in our data. Another source of endogeneity is the wealth paradox, 
                                                 
12 Since the income of the child can be assumed to be low this might not be such a big problem.   17 
 
which means that children from land-rich families have more wealth and are more likely to 
work than children from land-poor families.
13  Grootaert (1998) suggests that since household 
income is endogenous, it should not be included as an explanatory variable. To capture, in 
some way, the special constraints that face the poorest part of the population , he includes a 
categorical variable that indicates if the household belongs to the lowest income quintile. We 
follow his example, but use expenditures per capita to identify the poverty level of the family. 
Since the poverty level differs between geographic areas we create the  variable based on 
regional data.
14      
         A larger household gives fewer resources per individual, which we expect increases the 
child’s probability of working. With a large number of younger siblings, the probability that 
an older child has to work to support them might increase.
15 We expect the child’s probability 
of working to increase if the head of household is too sick to work. The age of the head of 
household will also be included. 
       The variable indicating if the head of household has an own business or if the family has 
its own farm is intended to catch the marginal utility of letting the child work and the child’s 
possibility of finding somewhere to work. The probability of finding a job is also expected to 
be influenced by the employment status of the head of household. To capture this, we include 
a variable indicating if the head of household is unemployed. This has two impacts on the 
child’s probability of working. There can be a negative effect, since an unemployed head of 
household means that it might be harder for the child to find somewhere to work. There can 
be a positive effect since, if the head of household does not work, this means that there is a 
higher incentive to send the child to work to increase the household income.  
                                                 
13 For more about the wealth paradox see Bhalotra and Heady (2003).  
14 We will also run regressions with different measurements of poverty to see how this influences the results.    
15 There might also be the case that the parents select one (or some) child(ren) that they invest more in. If this is 
the case, it does not have to be older siblings that support younger ones, but it might be the other way around.  18 
 
            We expect heads of household with a higher level of education to have a preference 
for education, which reduces the probability that they will send their children to work. We 
also expect a decreased probability for the child to work if the mother’s power increases. 
Since our data do not state who the mother is, we use the head of household if that person is a 
woman, or the woman who is reportedly the spouse of the head of household. The woman’s 
power is measured with a dummy variable indicating whether she is a wage worker or not. 
We expect a lower rate of working children when the woman has full control. To measure 
this, the model includes a variable that indicates if the head of household is a woman. We also 
control for whether the household is run by a single parent.  
5.4. Social norm 
The social norm is measured as the share of the working children in the same town. We 
expect a positive relationship between the percentage of children working and the probability 
of a certain child working. If child i is working or not is not assumed to influence the norm.
16  
5.5. Geography 
Dummy  variables  indicating  if  the  child  lives  in  Nairobi,  Central,  Coast,  Eastern,  North 
Eastern, Nyanza or the Rift Valley are used to capture the different provinces’ characteristics, 
such as school quality and work opportunities. Western is used as the reference category. We 
also include a dummy variable indicating if the child lives in the urban or the rural parts of the 
country.  
 
The variables are summarized in the appendix along with descriptive statistics. 
                                                 
16 To reduce the influence of child i, we take away the specific child when measuring the norm, thereby 









The probabilities of working and attending school increase with age. The working decision 
can be explained by the marginal productivity since the child’s work productivity increases 
with age. The positive coefficient in the schooling decision is consistent with the fact that 
some children start school later than the age of six. The gender of the child does not influence 
the probability of working.   
           If the head of household is unemployed, the child’s probability of working is reduced 
and the effect becomes larger if the household is poor. One explanation for this could be that 
the possibility of finding a job gets more limited if the head is not working. In the sample 41 
percent of the working children stated that they had obtained their job through a parent or 
relative. The result is also consistent with the view that the labor market is more limited for 
the poorest households, which could explain some of the positive income effect. 
           Another result indicating that the possibility of finding a job is important is the positive 
and significant coefficients for family business and having a farm. An alternative explanation 
could be that parents regard training of the child as a good investment if the child is expected 
to work in the family business in the future.  
         When the size of the household increases, the child’s probability of working decreases. 
The number of young siblings increases the probability of the child working and decreases the 
probability of the child being a full time student, which supports the view that older children 
have to provide for younger ones. Being a biological child of the head of household decreases 20 
 
the  probability  of  working  and  increases  the  probability  of  being  a  full-time  student, 
indicating that the head gives priority to his/her own children.  
        As expected, the education of the head of household has a negative impact on the child’s 
probability of working and a positive impact on the probability of being a full time student. 
We interpret the coefficient as a measurement of the parents’ taste for education, but it might 
also include an income effect. If the head of household has a primary education, instead of no 
education, the probability of the child working is reduced by approximately 1.4 percent. There 
does not seem to be any difference between having primary or higher education.  
       A female head of household does not influence the working or schooling decision, but if 
the woman is a wage worker, this increases the probability of the child working and lowers 
the probability of the child being a full-time student.  
       The probability of the parents sending their children to work increases if more children in 
the same town are working. Hence, the social norm influences the parents’ decision.
17 The 
correlation coefficient for the error terms is  significant and negative, which shows that there 
are unobserved factors that increase the probability  of the child working and decrease the 
probability of being a full-time student.  
      We find no evidence to support the hypothesis that poorer families are more prone to send 
their children to work. Instead, there is a negative and significant coefficient for the variable 
indicating that a child lives in one of the poorest households. This could be due to the 
endogeneity of the variable. To test how our definition of the poverty measurement influences 
the result, we run the model with different measurements of poverty. Table 7 presents the 
results. 
 
                                                 
17 We also run the regression with two different norm variables (not included in the paper), one for the working 
decision included in the first equation, and one for the school decision included in the second equation. Both 
coefficients become positive and significant. The coefficient for the norm variable in the working equation does 




The  only  time  we  obtain  a  result  that  supports  the  hypothesis  that  children  from  poorer 
families have a higher probability of working is when we us a dummy variable that shows if 
the family has a toilet and a variable that shows if they have a kitchen. Not having a toilet has 
a positive effect on the probability of working. All other specifications reject the hypothesis 
that being poor increases the probability of working. Living in one of the poorest households 
has a negative and significant effect. If we instead use expenditures for the last month, we get 
a positive and significant relationship with the probability of working. We refrain from giving 
the result too much weight, since it is not robust and the variables suffer from endogeneity 
        Since the working decision is linked to the schooling decision it is relevant to investigate 




Given that the child is a full time student, the probability of working, evaluated at the mean, is 
2.3 percent, as opposed to 6.0 percent when the child is not a full-time student. The variables 
that determine the probability of working for full-time students also apply to other children. 
However, the magnitude of the marginal effect differs, where the effects in most cases get 
stronger for children who are not in school full-time. 
       We are aware that the data design ends up in a sample that it is not representative for 
Kenya’s population. To control for this we run a weighted regression. Table 9 presents the 
results for the model with weights
18.  
 
                                                 
18 From this point on the tables only include the results from the working equation since this is where our main 




Using weights does not change our conclusions. From now on we run our model without 
using weights.  
       As previously mentioned, how one defines child work/labor differs in the literature and 
there  is  also  a  diversion  in  the  age  groups  included.  We  control  for  this  by  running  the 
regressions with different definitions. This is important not only for the robustness but also 




When we change the sample to children aged 10-14, none of the coefficients change sign. The 
results are still robust when we define the dependent variable as children working at least 20 
hours a week. The coefficients for family business decrease to some extent in comparison 
with the base line specification, indicating that these factors might be more important for 
short-time work. It seems like the educational level of the head of household is less important 
when deciding if the child should work long hours or not.   
         The last alteration is to change the dependent variable to children that did work at some 
time during the 12 months preceding the survey. This change has the largest effect on the 
results, indicating that the decision to work at some time during a year is different from the 
decision to work on a more regular basis. The coefficient for having a farm is still positive but 
increases in magnitude, which is consistent with the view that many children work during 
harvest. This explanation is also supported by the fact that the coefficient for living in an 
urban area becomes negative and significant.  23 
 
          We run two separate regressions to see if there are different factors that determine if a 




That a working woman lives in the household has a positive and significant effect for girls, 
but does not have any impact on the boys’ working decision. This could indicate that if the 
mother works, the daughter might work with her. Living in an urban area has a negative and 
significant effect for boys, but no effect for girls.  
         We would also like to know what determines how much the child works. To analyze 
this we run a tobit regression where the dependent variable is the number of hours the child 
worked the week before the survey. The data are censored, excluding children that did not 




The result shows that the decision to work and time spent working are determined by the 
same  factors.  It  seems  like  children  living  in  poorer  households  work  fewer  hours  than 
children from richer households. The older the child is, the more it works. Having a farm or a 
family business increases the number of hours worked, and the same is true for having a sick 
head of household. Being the biological child of the head of household reduces the number of 
hours worked. If the head of household is unemployed the number of hours is reduced, while 
a working woman increases the number of hours worked. When the head of household has an 
education, the number of hours worked is reduced.   24 
 
7. Conclusions  
 
One of the main determinants of working children is the educational status of the head of 
household. This result is robust over all different specifications and has been supported in 
earlier research. If the head of household has attained primary education, in comparison with 
no  education  at  all,  the  child’s  probability  of  working  is  reduced  by  approximately  1.4 
percent. Moreover, if the child is working, having a head of household with at least primary 
education  reduces  the  hours  spent  working.  It  does  not  seem  to  matter  if  the  head  of 
household has primary or secondary level of education. Primary education has been made free 
of charge in Kenya since the time period used in this paper. Investigating how this policy has 
influenced the rate of working children would be an interesting topic for further research. 
         Norms influence the probability that a child is working. In order to reduce the rate of 
working children, we need to identify the factors that determine the norm. This can sometimes 
be hard and more research is needed.  
         Our results do not support the hypothesis that poorer children have a higher probability 
of working.  Instead, the results  show that living in  a poor household  reduces  the  child’s 
probability of working. One possible explanation is the endogeneity problem. The result is not 
robust but makes us at least question the common view that it is the poorest children that 
work. 
          The  probability  of  working  increases  with  age,  which  supports  the  view  that 
productivity  influences  the  probability  of  working,  since  older  children  tend  to  be  more 
productive than younger ones. The probability of working and the amount of hours spent 
working also increase when the child has younger siblings.  25 
 
          There do not seem to be any large differences between the genders; having a working 
mother has a positive effect on the probability of a girl working, but has no impact on boys. 
Boys seem more likely to work when the family lives in the rural parts of the country.      
           The robust and positive effects of having a family business or farm on the probability 
of working indicate that the rate of working children is influenced by the possibility of finding 
work. This view is also supported by the negative effect of having a head of the household 
who is unemployed and the sometimes positive effect of having a working woman in the 
household. 
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Table 1: Rate of working children in each age category     
 
Age of child  Girls 
n = 6 783 
Boys 
n =7 208 
Total 
n = 13 991   
6  5.3  5.4  5.4 
7  4.6  6.0  5.4 
8  7.1  6.0  6.5 
9  5.2  5.4  5.3 
10  7.3  8.3  7.8 
11  7.4  8.4  7.9 
12  8.2  8.6  8.4 
13  8.2  11.1  9.7 
14  12.7  13.2  13.0 




Table 2: Why the child works 
 
Why the child works according to the child   Why the child works according to the parent 
n = 1076  Percent  n = 718  Percent 
Augment household income  21  Augment household income  39 
Assist in household 
enterprises/business 
6  Help in family business/farm  56 
Help in household chores  27  Child to be self-reliant  5 
Suggestion of parents  17  Education/training environment not suit  0 
Support self  21  Other  1 




Figure 1:  Hours worked    
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Table 3: Rate of children working, rate of children at school full time  
 
Age  At school full time (%) 
n = 13 991  
 
At school full time if the child was working 
(%) 
n = 1 082  
6  60.8  38.1 
7  72.2  50.0 
8  77.5  57.1 
9  78.1  68.4 
10  79.4  66.2 
11  79.9  71.4 
12  74.7  60.6 
13  74.2  60.3 
14  71.0  42.0 




Table 4:  Education of head of household  
 
  Total sample 
n = 13 991 
Working children 
n = 1 082 
None  25.9  42.6 
Primary  49.2  41.8 
Secondary and above   24.9  15.6 
 Note: When looking at the subsample of working children some households will be counted more than once since they can 





Table 5: Difference in rate of working children and full time students between provinces.  
  Working children (%)  Full time student (%)  n 
Nairobi  0.0  77.6  152 
Central  3.8  78.4  1 799 
Coast  13.2  66.6  1 413 
Eastern  12.9  74.8  2 067 
North Eastern  0.0  56.4  39 
Nyanza  2.6  77.6  2 614 
Rift Valley  7.9  73.4  4 253 
Western  9.3  71.7  1 654 
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Table 6: Bivariate probit 
     Working decision  Schooling decision 
 
n = 13 606  n = 13 606 
 
Coefficients  Marginal effects  Coefficients  Marginal effects 








  Age  0.074***  0.005***  0.014***  0.004*** 
 
(0.007)  (0.001)  (0.005)  (0.002) 
Boy  0.037  0.003  -0.016  -0.005 
 
(0.036)  (0.003)  (0.024)  (0.008) 
Poor  -0.746***  -0.036***  0.004  0.001 
 
(0.065)  (0.002)  (0.033)  (0.010) 
Farm  0.520***  0.036***  -0.071**  -0.022** 
 
(0.050)  (0.003)  (0.029)  (0.009) 
Familybusiness  0.253***  0.018***  0.053*  0.017* 
 
(0.051)  (0.003)  (0.031)  (0.010) 
Size of household  -0.018**  -0.001**  0.039***  0.012*** 
 
(0.009)  (0.001)  (0.006)  (0.002) 
Young siblings  0.089***  0.006***  -0.100***  -0.032*** 
 
(0.021)  (0.002)  (0.014)  (0.005) 
Biological child  -0.260***  -0.023***  0.158***  0.052*** 
 
(0.058)  (0.006)  (0.040)  (0.014) 
Working mother  0.185**  0.016*  -0.122**  -0.040** 
 
(0.091)  (0.009)  (0.051)  (0.017) 
Age of head  0.003  0.000  0.002  0.001 
 
(0.002)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.000) 
Head unemployed  -0.335**  -0.019***  -0.010  -0.003 
 
(0.140)  (0.006)  (0.062)  (0.020) 
Poor and unemployed  -4.528***  -0.036***  -0.055  -0.018 
 
(0.181)  (0.002)  (0.125)  (0.041) 
Head sick  0.289**  0.027**  -0.170**  -0.057** 
 
(0.113)  (0.013)  (0.075)  (0.026) 
Female head  -0.065  -0.005  0.026  0.008 
 
(0.102)  (0.007)  (0.064)  (0.020) 
Single parent  0.117  0.009  0.049  0.015 
 
(0.101)  (0.008)  (0.063)  (0.020) 
Educprimary  -0.194***  -0.014***  0.291***  0.092*** 
 
(0.045)  (0.003)  (0.031)  (0.010) 
Educsecondaryplus  -0.181***  -0.012***  0.411***  0.121*** 
 
(0.061)  (0.004)  (0.040)  (0.011) 
Norm  4.854***  0.353***  -0.433***  -0.138*** 
 
(0.203)  (0.018)  (0.159)  (0.050) 
Urban  -0.015  -0.001  0.602***  0.157*** 
 
(0.098)  (0.007)  (0.056)  (0.011) 
Nairobi  -4.240***  -0.036***  -0.422***  -0.150*** 
 
(0.131)  (0.002)  (0.134)  (0.052) 
Central  -0.411***  -0.023***  0.200***  0.060*** 
 
(0.080)  (0.003)  (0.050)  (0.014) 
Coast  -0.325***  -0.019***  -0.081  -0.026 
 
(0.077)  (0.003)  (0.052)  (0.017) 
Eastern  -0.220***  -0.014***  0.135***  0.041*** 
 
(0.064)  (0.003)  (0.047)  (0.014) 
NorthEasterna  -4.564***  -0.033***  -0.767***  -0.286*** 
 
(0.197)  (0.002)  (0.232)  (0.092) 
Nyanza  -0.384***  -0.023***  0.147***  0.045*** 
 
(0.077)  (0.004)  (0.045)  (0.013) 
RiftValley  -0.280***  -0.019***  0.122***  0.038*** 
 
(0.059)  (0.004)  (0.041)  (0.012) 
ρ  -0.267*** 
     
 
(0.024) 
      Notes: *** 1 percent significance level, ** 5 percent significance level, *10 percent significance level.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Reference province is Western. Marginal effects at the mean.  
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Table 7: Bivariate probit. Different ways to measure poverty. 
 
                                                           Working decision 
                                                            Bivariate probit, marginal effects 
                                                                n = 13 606 
 
Age   0.005***  0.005***  0.005***  0.006*** 
 
(0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Boy  0.003  0.003  0.002  0.002 
 
(0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Poor1  -0.036***  -0.039*** 
   
 
(0.002)  (0.002) 
    Poor2 
 
-0.020*** 
   
   
(0.003) 
    Poo3 
 
-0.004 
   
   
(0.003) 
    Log(exp) 
   
0.022*** 
 
     
(0.001) 
  No toilet 
     
0.015*** 
       
(0.005) 
No kitchen 
     
0.004 
       
(0.004) 
Farm  0.036***  0.037***  0.038***  0.036*** 
 
(0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.004) 
Familybusiness  0.018***  0.018***  0.017***  0.017*** 
 
(0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.004) 
Size of household  -0.001**  -0.002***  -0.003***  -0.000 
 
(0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Youngsiblings  0.006***  0.007***  0.007***  0.005*** 
 
(0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Biological child  -0.023***  -0.022***  -0.021***  -0.024*** 
 
(0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006) 
Working mother  0.016*  0.014  0.008  0.015 
 
(0.009)  (0.009)  (0.008)  (0.009) 
Age of head  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000** 
 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Head unemployed  -0.019***  -0.018***  -0.017***  -0.018*** 
 
(0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.006) 
Poor and unemployed  -0.036***  -0.035***  -0.035***  -0.040*** 
 
(0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Head sick  0.027**  0.028**  0.033**  0.022* 
 
(0.013)  (0.013)  (0.014)  (0.013) 
Female head  -0.005  -0.004  -0.003  -0.002 
 
(0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007) 
Single parent  0.009  0.009  0.008  0.006 
 
(0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008) 
Educprimary  -0.014***  -0.015***  -0.014***  -0.007** 
 
(0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.004) 
Educsecondaryplus  -0.012***  -0.016***  -0.018***  -0.001 
 
(0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.005) 
Norm  0.353***  0.343***  0.342***  0.350*** 
 
(0.018)  (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.019) 
Urban  -0.001  -0.004  -0.008  0.003 
 
(0.007)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.008) 
Notes: *** 1 percent significance level, ** 5 percent significance level, *10 percent significance level.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Province dummies not reported. Marginal effects at the mean.  
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Table 8: Conditional marginal effect after bivariate probit 
  Pr(child is working | student)  Pr(child is working | not student) 
                  
         Pr(b02=1|a06=1)  = .023   
n = 13 606 
 
Pr(b02=1|a06=0) = .060  
n = 13 606  
Age  0.004***  0.009*** 
  (0.000)  (0.001) 
Boy  0.002  0.004 
  (0.002)  (0.004) 
Poor  -0.027***  -0.063*** 
  (0.002)  (0.004) 
Farm  0.027***  0.059*** 
  (0.003)  (0.006) 
Family business  0.014***  0.031*** 
  (0.003)  (0.006) 
Size of household  -0.001  -0.001 
  (0.000)  (0.001) 
Youngsiblings  0.004***  0.009*** 
  (0.001)  (0.003) 
Biological child  -0.016***  -0.032*** 
  (0.004)  (0.009) 
Working mother  0.011  0.022 
  (0.007)  (0.014) 
Age of head  0.000*  0.000* 
  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Head unemployed  -0.014***  -0.032*** 
  (0.004)  (0.010) 
Poor and unemployed  -0.026***  -0.067*** 
  (0.002)  (0.004) 
Head sick  0.019*  0.038* 
  (0.010)  (0.020) 
Female head  -0.003  -0.007 
  (0.005)  (0.012) 
Single parent  0.007  0.016 
  (0.006)  (0.013) 
Educprimary  -0.009***  -0.017*** 
  (0.003)  (0.005) 
Educsecondaryplus  -0.007**  -0.012* 
  (0.003)  (0.007) 
Norm  0.270***  0.584*** 
  (0.017)  (0.036) 
Urban  0.003  0.014 
  (0.006)  (0.014) 
Notes: *** 1 percent significance level, ** 5 percent significance level, *10 percent significance level.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Province dummies not reported. 
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n = 13 606 
Age  0.003*** 
 
(0.000) 
Boy  0.002*** 
 
(0.000) 
Poor  -0.015*** 
 
(0.000) 
farm  0.019*** 
 
(0.000) 
Familybusiness  0.009*** 
 
(0.000) 
Size of household  -0.001*** 
 
(0.000) 
Youngsiblings  0.003*** 
 
(0.000) 
Biological child  -0.018*** 
 
(0.000) 
Workingmother  0.010*** 
 
(0.000) 
Age of head  -0.000 
 
(0.000) 
Head unemployed  -0.009*** 
 
(0.000) 
Poor and unemployed  -0.015*** 
 
(0.000) 
Head sick  0.007*** 
 
(0.000) 
Female head  -0.001*** 
 
(0.000) 
Single parent  0.002*** 
 
(0.000) 
Educprimary  -0.006*** 
 
(0.000) 
Educsecondaryplus  -0.006*** 
 
(0.000) 
Norm  0.155*** 
 
(0.000) 
Urban  -0.004*** 
 
(0.000) 
Notes: *** 1 percent significance level, ** 5 percent significance level, *10 percent significance level.  
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Table 10: Bivariat probit with different groups, unconditional marginal effects 
  
 













Did child work last 
year?  
Aged 6-14  
 
 
n = 13 606   n = 7 629  n = 13 606  n = 13 606 
              
Age  0.005***  0.008***  0.004***  0.012*** 
 
(0.001)  (0.002)  (0.000)  (0.001) 
Boy  0.003  0.005  0.002  0.005 
 
(0.003)  (0.004)  (0.002)  (0.006) 
Poor  -0.036***  -0.050***  -0.023***  -0.062*** 
 
(0.002)  (0.004)  (0.002)  (0.007) 
farm  0.036***  0.041***  0.024***  0.059*** 
 
(0.003)  (0.005)  (0.003)  (0.007) 
Familybusiness  0.018***  0.021***  0.009***  0.027*** 
 
(0.003)  (0.006)  (0.003)  (0.008) 
Size of household  -0.001**  -0.001  -0.001  -0.003** 
 
(0.001)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.001) 
Youngsiblings  0.006***  0.007***  0.005***  0.014*** 
 
(0.002)  (0.003)  (0.001)  (0.004) 
Biological child  -0.023***  -0.044***  -0.018***  -0.032*** 
 
(0.006)  (0.010)  (0.005)  (0.011) 
Workingmother  0.016*  0.018  0.008  0.043*** 
 
(0.009)  (0.014)  (0.006)  (0.016) 
Age of head  0.000  -0.000  0.000**  0.001** 
 
(0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Head unemployed  -0.019***  -0.026***  -0.010**  -0.011 
 
(0.006)  (0.010)  (0.005)  (0.017) 
Poor and unemployed  -0.036***  -0.053***  -0.024***  0.103** 
 
(0.002)  (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.046) 
Head sick  0.027**  0.037*  0.012  0.066*** 
 
(0.013)  (0.021)  (0.009)  (0.024) 
Female head  -0.005  -0.002  -0.004  -0.006 
 
(0.007)  (0.013)  (0.006)  (0.016) 
Single parent  0.009  0.004  0.002  0.020 
 
(0.008)  (0.013)  (0.006)  (0.017) 
Educprimary  -0.014***  -0.022***  -0.008***  -0.007 
 
(0.003)  (0.006)  (0.003)  (0.008) 
Educsecondaryplus  -0.012***  -0.022***  -0.005  -0.014 
 
(0.004)  (0.006)  (0.003)  (0.010) 
Norm  0.353***  0.454***  0.244***  0.837*** 
 
(0.018)  (0.030)  (0.015)  (0.038) 
Urban  -0.001  -0.003  0.003  -0.092*** 
 
(0.007)  (0.011)  (0.006)  (0.010) 
Notes: *** 1 percent significance level, ** 5 percent significance level, *10 percent significance level.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Province dummies not reported. Marginal effects at the mean.  37 
 
Table 11:  Bivariate probit is there a difference between gender 
   Girls 
n = 6 599 
Boys 
n = 7 007 
Age  0.005***  0.005*** 
 
(0.001)  (0.001) 
Poor  -0.036***  -0.035*** 
 
(0.003)  (0.003) 
farm  0.036***  0.035*** 
 
(0.005)  (0.005) 
Familybusiness  0.016***  0.019*** 
 
(0.005)  (0.005) 
Size of household  -0.001  -0.002* 
 
(0.001)  (0.001) 
Youngsiblings  0.007***  0.005** 
 
(0.002)  (0.002) 
Biological child  -0.028***  -0.015** 
 
(0.009)  (0.007) 
Workingmother  0.037**  -0.005 
 
(0.015)  (0.009) 
Age of head  0.000  0.000** 
 
(0.000)  (0.000) 
Head unemployed  -0.018**  -0.018** 
 
(0.007)  (0.008) 
Poor and unemployed  -0.034***  -0.036*** 
 
(0.002)  (0.003) 
Head sick  0.020  0.031 
 
(0.017)  (0.019) 
Female head  0.000  -0.006 
 
(0.009)  (0.010) 
Single parent  0.003  0.012 
 
(0.010)  (0.012) 
Educprimary  -0.012***  -0.015*** 
 
(0.005)  (0.004) 
Educsecondaryplus  -0.015***  -0.010* 
 
(0.005)  (0.005) 
Norm  0.355***  0.340*** 
 
(0.027)  (0.025) 
Urban  0.017  -0.019*** 
 
(0.012)  (0.007) 
Notes: *** 1 percent significance level, ** 5 percent significance level, *10 percent significance level.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Province dummies not reported. 
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Table 12: Tobit 
Tobit 
Left censored at 0 
12 574  left-censored observations 
1032     uncensored observations           
Constant  52.902*** 
 
(1.040) 
Age  4.064*** 
 
(0.382) 
Boy  2.123 
 
(1.821) 
Poor  -36.513*** 
 
(3.223) 
Farm  26.327*** 
 
(2.512) 
Familybusiness  11.695*** 
 
(2.577) 
Size of household  -0.738 
 
(0.483) 
Youngsiblings  4.831*** 
 
(1.047) 
Biological child  -16.474*** 
 
(3.104) 
Workingmother  8.861* 
 
(4.764) 
Age of head  0.160 
 
(0.101) 
Head unemployed  -16.221** 
 
(7.850) 
Poor and unemployed  -261.060 
 
(0.000) 
Head sick  10.940* 
 
(5.735) 
Female head  -4.512 
 
(5.301) 
Single parent  4.703 
 
(5.270) 
Educprimary  -10.415*** 
 
(2.242) 
Educsecondaryplus  -9.659*** 
 
(3.090) 
Norm  239.751*** 
 
(9.974) 
Urban  5.009 
 
(5.054) 
Notes: *** 1 percent significance level, ** 5 percent significance level, *10 percent significance level.  
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Province dummies not reported. 













Age  Age in completed years 
 
Gender  Female = 0 
Male  = 1 
 




Poor  Dummy variables indicating if the family belongs to the poorest 
quartile of the households in the region. Based on expenditures 
per capita. 
  
Farm  Dummy variable indicating if the head of household works on a 
farm.  
 
Family business  Dummy variable indicating if the head of household has his 
own business or works as an unpaid family worker.  
   
Size  Number of members in household 
 
Number of young 
siblings 
Number of children in the household that are younger than 6. 
 
   
Female head   Dummy variable indicating if the head of household is female.   
 
Working woman  If  woman works for wage =1 
Otherwise = 0 
 
Education of head of household  Highest academic level reached.  
None 
Primary 
Secondary and above  
 
 
A dummy variable is created for each level where no education 
is the reference alternative. 
 
Age of head of household  Age of head of household. 
 
Head Unemployed  Dummy variable indicating if the head of household is 
unemployed. 
 
Head of household sick  Dummy variable indicating if the head of household is too sick 
to work.  
 
Poor and unemployed   Dummy variable indicating if the household is poor and the 
head of household is unemployed.  
   
Single parent  Dummy variable indicating if the head of household is a single 
parent. 
 




















A dummy variable is created for each province.  
 
Urban/rural  Urban = 1 





A2: Descriptive statistics  
   Children aged 6-14 
n = 13 991 
Children aged 10-14 
n = 7 827 








Working  .077 
(.267) 
0;1  .094    
 (.291) 
0;1 
Student  .742 
(.438) 
0;1  .757     
(.429) 
0;1 
Age  9.991 
(2.577) 
6;14  11.963     
(1.442) 
10;14 
Male  .515 
(.500) 
0;1  .510     
(.500) 
0;1 
P1  .166 
(.372) 
0;1  .158     
(.365) 
0;1 
Farm  .569 
(.495) 
0;1  .577     
(.494) 
0;1 
Family business  .615 
(.487) 
0;1  .622     
(.485) 
0;1 
Size  6.973 
(2.614) 
2;30  7.007     
(2.547) 
2;30 
Young siblings  .858 
(1.001) 
0;9  .734     
(.951) 
0;9 
Biological  .868 
(.338) 
0;1  .870    
(.336) 
0;1 
Primary education  .492 
(.500) 







0;1  .238     
(.426) 
0;1 
Working woman  .073 
(.259) 
0;1  .069      
(.254) 
0;1 
Female head  .270 
(.444) 
0;1  .279     
(.449) 
0;1 
Age of head  45.058 
(11.704) 
9;99  46.331    
(11.451) 
15;99 
Head Unemployed  .056 
(.229) 
0;1  .055     
(.228) 
0;1 
Poor and Unemployed  .011 
(.103) 
0;1  .010     
(.097) 
0;1 
Head sick  .025 
(.156) 
0;1  .025     
(.157) 
0;1 
Single parent  .314 
(.464) 
0;1  .322     
(.467) 
0;1 




0; .440  .073     
(.083)           
0; .440 
Urban  .098 
    (.298) 
0;1  .095     
(.294) 
0;1 
Nairobi  .011     
(.104) 
0;1  .010     
(.099) 
0;1 
Central  .129     
(.335) 
0;1  .136     
(.343) 
0;1 
Coast  .101     
(.301) 
0;1  .096     
(.294) 
0;1 
Eastern  .148     
(.355) 
0;1  .152     
(.359)  
0;1 
North Eastern  .003     
(.053) 
0;1  .003     
(.056)       
0;1 
Nyanza  .187    
(.390) 
0;1  .194     
(.396) 
0;1 
Rift Valley  .304     
(.460) 
0;1  .295      
(.456) 
0;1 42 
 
 